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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REDLINING:
THE POTENTIAL FOR HOLDING BANKS LIABLE
AS STATE ACTORS
Joan Kane*
I. INTRODUCTION
Many Americans would argue that all individuals are treated equally.
There are, however, no facts to support this assertion. Over one hundred
years ago the Civil War Amendments declared slavery to be illegal.1 Yet
statistics show that minorities, especially African Americans, are
categorically denied many of the basic rights guaranteed by the
Constitution.2
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads: "No
person ... shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law."3 Current data, however, reveal that a large portion of the
American population is denied these basic constitutional rights, especially
the right to property. Financial institutions effectuate this deprivation
through the discriminatory denial of mortgage loans based upon the
applicants race.4
A home is undoubtedly the most expensive, and perhaps the most
important, purchase an individual will make in her lifetime. Unlike other
possessions, a home takes on the personality of its owners and reveals
J.D. Candidate 1994, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William & Mary.
The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution are considered the Civil War Amendments. This name is derived from the
passage of each amendment in response to the issues that led to and followed the Civil
War, most notably, slavery. The Fourteenth Amendment was enacted because the states
could not be trusted to protect the rights of individuals. Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking
State Action, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 503, 515 (1985).
The Thirteenth Amendment reads: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except
as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist
within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIII, § 1.
The Fourteenth Amendment extends protection to citizens from the actions of the
states. The most notable portions of this amendment are the extension of the Due Process
Clause and the creation of the Equal Protection Clause. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2 Paulette Thomas, Blacks Still Face a Host of Trying Conditions in Getting
Mortgages, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 1992, at Al.
3 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
4 See Thomas, supra note 2. See also Robert J. Bruss, Loan Prejudice Still a Problem,
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Aug. 15, 1993, at H28.
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much about its residents. To deny individuals the opportunity to own a
home is, in some sense, to deprive them of their rights of individual
development. Banks, however, use discriminatory lending practices to deny
large segments of the population the right to be independent of landlords
and to experience home ownership.5
Home ownership also has constitutional implications. Pursuant to the
United States Constitution, there are basic rights relating to property.6
These constitutional rights impose no affirmative obligation on the
government to supply property to all people, but there is a right to equal
opportunity for property.7 Lenders deny individuals this opportunity when
they discriminate on the basis of race.
Congress attempted to prevent discriminatory lending practices, or
redlining,8 by enacting legislation designed to reach all lenders in the
mortgage market. Separate from the tangled web of financial institution
regulation, these anti-discrimination laws fare poorly for the populations
they were enacted to protect.9 Legislation enacted to protect minority
interests has failed to prevent banks from discriminating. 10
"But for the availability of credit, it would be impossible for most Americans to...
own a home .... "Judith B. Henry, Comment, Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments
of 1976, 12 U. RICH. L. REV. 203, 203 (1977), quoted in Winnie F. Taylor, Meeting the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act's Specificity Requirement: Judgmental and Statistical
Scoring Systems, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 73, 73 n.1 (1980). The Chairman of the Federal
National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), James Johnson, stated, "We see evidence
that there are a significant number of prospective home buyers in this country whose only
barrier to achieving their dream of home ownership is not their economic status but their
racial status." Thomas, supra note 2, at Al.
6 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V (due process and takings protection); U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1 (anti-discrimination).
7 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 78-79 (1917). See also 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1988)
("All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory,
as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey
real and personal property.").
8 Redlining is the process of drawing or outlining a geographic area within which
lending will be denied due to the composition or characteristics of the area. WARREN L.
DENNIS & J. STANLEY POTrINGER, FEDERAL REGULATION OF BANKING: REDLINING AND
COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT 1.02, at 1-4 (1980).
9 See infra text accompanying notes 61-97.
10 A 1992 Wall Street Journal study compiled and analyzed data from computer tapes
provided by the Federal Reserve. These statistics detailed mortgage lending rates for banks
in major metropolitan areas. In New York, where 26% of the population is African
American, 12.9% of 1991 mortgage applications were submitted by African Americans.
The ratio of rejection, compared to white applicants, was 1'.89. In Chicago, where African
Americans comprise 21.9% of the population, 8.3% of all applications were from African
Americans, and the ratio of rejection was 3.08. This signifies that in Chicago,
African Americans were denied mortgages three times as often as whites. Edward P.
Foldessy, Largest Metropolitan Areas, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 1992, at A8 (table).
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REDLINING
This Note will analyze the possibility of holding banks to a
constitutional standard of equal protection when rMaking mortgage
decisions. First, the Note will trace the development of discrimination in
mortgage lending, beginning in the early twentieth century. Next, the Note
will explore the anti-discrimination regulations affecting the banking
industry, a structure which has failed to protect minority interests. The
Note will then explain why there is a need for an equal protection
standard. Finally, the potential for holding banks liable as state actors
pursuant to equal protection analysis will be discussed.
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON REDLINING
A. Defining Redlining
Senator William Proxmire, in a 1977 speech to Congress during
debate on the Community Reinvestment Act, stated:
By redlining let me make it clear what I am talking about.
I am talking about the fact that banks and savings and loans
will take their deposits from a community and instead of
reinvesting them in that community, they will invest them
elsewhere, and they will actually or figuratively draw a red
line on a map around the areas of their city, sometimes in
the inner city, sometimes in the older neighborhoods,
sometimes ethnic and sometimes black, but often
encompassing a great area of their neighborhood. "
Although generally linked to the refusal of mortgages, statutes also
define redlining to encompass acts short of the total denial of loans. The
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) defines redlining
to include the following: the requirement of larger down payments, higher
closing costs, higher loan interest rates, and the refusal to lend on property
The metropolitan area faring best was Los Angeles, where the ratio was 1.40. Id. This
low ratio, however, is attributable to the relatively high level of racial integration within
the city. Robert Rosenblatt, No Gains Seen in Minority Lending, Los ANGELES TIMES,
Oct. 28, 1992, at DI. Most cities, including Atlanta, Detroit, and St. Louis, demonstrated
ratios above 2.0. Foldessy, supra.
1 123 CONG. REC. 17,630 (1977) (statement of Sen. Proxmire), quoted in Jonathon P.
Tomes, The "Community" in the Community Reinvestment Act: A Term in Search of a
Definition, 10 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 225, 227 n.9 (1991).
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over a certain age.12 Since minorities often inhabit older neighborhoods,
denying mortgages on older homes limits minority access to property.
Redlining may result from a lendets conscious decision to deny loans
to a particular area.13 If all banks in a particular area agree that minority
neighborhoods are high risk credit areas, no bank will extend loans, fearing
that the money will not be repaid. Redlining can be a legitimate practice,
however, if the factors utilized in determining whether to make loans are
truly predictive of risk.' 4 Racial redlining does not rely on predictive
factors, but rather makes discriminatory assumptions that minorities, by
nature of race, are unable or unwilling to repay loans.'5 Caucasians, it
appears, "enjoy a general presumption of creditworthiness" which does not
extend to other racial groups.'
6
12 U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, REDLINING AND
DISINVESTMENT AS A DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICE IN RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE LOANS pt.
II, at 4 (1977). In analyzing Boston area mortgage applicants, the Boston Federal Reserve
found that only 20% of mortgage applicants were completely qualified or unqualified. All
other applicants fell somewhere between the ends of this spectrum. Thomas, supra note
2, at Al.
13 DENNIS & POTrINGER, supra note 8, 1.02, at 1-4.
'4 For example, the location of property within a flood plain or on a fault line may
create a risk beyond the level acceptable to lenders, leading to the denial of loans. See id.
1.02, at 1-7.
"5 One author advocated segregation for the maintenance of property values, stating
that "race ... can result in a very rapid decline." FRED BABCOCK, THE VALUATION OF
REAL ESTATE 91 (1932).
16 Mitchell Zuckoff, Study Shows Racial Bias in Lending; Gap Cited in Boston-Area
Banks, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 9, 1992, Economy, at 1. See Jamie C. Mann et al.,
Developments in Banking Law: 1992, 12 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 1, 74 (1993). Opponents
of theories of expanding credit believe Americans have become too dependent upon credit
and too demanding of banks and other lenders:
Americans ... need to be reminded that credit is available to them as a privilege,
not as a legal right. Everyone who wants or needs credit cannot obtain it .... The
decision to grant or deny credit is usually based on an evaluation of the applicant's
creditworthiness, a process which generally involves evaluating a person's ability
and willingness to repay the creditor.
Taylor, supra note 5, at 73-74. This assertion lacks credibility. Minorities are often held
accountable for small, inaccurate blemishes on their credit reports, while white applicants
receive assistance in attempts to clarify negative credit histories. See Thomas, supra note
2, at Al (discussing Linsey family's denial of mortgage based on once disputed, but paid,
medical bill and difficulties encountered in finally acquiring mortgage financing).
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REDLINING
Redlining in real estate exists on a non-racial basis as well. 17 The
1978 Appraisal of Real Estate handbook states:
Redlining refers to the reluctance of lenders, investors, or
insurers to make loans, invest, or issue insurance on usual
terms in a particular geographic area because of some
feature or characteristic in the area that is perceived as
adversely affecting the utility or security and hence the
value of individual parcels of property in the area.'"
Racial redlining, however, creates larger problems with more long-term
effects. Supporters of this theory point to "disinvested areas" with low to
moderate incomes and older homes and the corresponding low lending
rates.' 9 These low lending ratios may stem from historic attempts to
maintain segregated residential neighborhoods.
B. Historical Development
Following World War II, large numbers of African Americans migrated
north to industrial urban areas.20 During this migration period, both
lenders and realtors believed that integration led to the devaluation of
property and therefore refused to lend or sell to minorities attempting to
move into "white" neighborhoods. 2' This prejudicial policy, unlike the
unwritten discriminatory policies that followed the Civil Rights Acts of
1964, was openly stated and followed. The discriminatory policy appeared
7 Following the toxic waste incident at Love Canal, New York, area banks denied
mortgages on local properties based upon the fear of liability for future environmental
problems associated with cleanup. After the Federal Housing Authority began insuring
mortgages, banks began lending. The loans, however, were accompanied by a disclaimer
making no guarantees as to the habitability of the premises. National Public Radio:
Morning Edition (radio broadcast, Oct. 13, 1992).
11 AMERICAN INST. OF REAL EST. APPRAISERS, THE APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE 1 11
(7th ed. 1978).
19 DENNIS & POrrINGER, supra note 8, 1.02, at 1-4. Also, areas with integrated
populations show lower lending rates than areas composed of all white residents. Id.
20 See Richard Lacayo, The Two Americas, TIME, May 18, 1992, at 28.
The invention of the trolley car in the early twentieth century allowed for the creation
of bedroom communities with easy access to the city. These "suburbs" experienced rapid
growth in the form of "white-flight." As immigrants and minorities, especially southern
African Americans, entered northern cities, whites moved to the suburbs but continued to
work in urban areas. See generally DENNIS & POTTINGER, supra note 8, 2.02, at 2-2
(discussing United States v. City of Black Jack, 408 F.2d 1179, 1186 (8th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975), and the doughnut-shaped racial composition of St. Louis,
with minorities in the "hole" and whites in the outlying suburbs).
21 DENNIS & POTrINGER, supra note 8, 2.02, at 2-3.
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in many handbooks for realtors and lenders during the middle part of the
twentieth century.22
Under segregationist policies, the growth of white suburbs demanded
that African Americans inhabit the cities, where the quality of life and
property conditions declined due to the onset of heavy industrialization.23
These overt private policies of segregation continued into the latter half of
the twentieth century. The statistical evidence available under the Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act indicates that the written prejudices of the past
have become the unwritten practice of today.24
22 Until 1950, the Code of Ethics of the National Association of Real Estate Boards
provided that realtors should not aid in integrating neighborhoods. Id. This attitude was
fostered and developed throughout this century. In 1923, authors McMichael and Bingham
wrote:
Frankly, rigid segregation seems to be the only manner in which the [racial tension]
difficulty can be effectively controlled. The colored people certainly have a right to
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness but they must recognize the economic
disturbance which their presence in a white neighborhood causes and forego their
desire to split off from the established district where the rest of their race lives.
STANLEY L. MCMICHAEL & ROBERT F. BINGHAM, CITY GROWTH AND VALUES 181-82
(1923). Additionally, this guide stated that "Property values have been sadly depreciated
by having a single colored family settle down on a street occupied exclusively by white
residents." Id. at 181.
A 1931 publication by McMichael, containing statements advocating segregation, was
considered the "bible of the real estate man." DENNIS & POTTINGER, supra note 8, 2.02,
at 2-5. The book contained a ranking of races and nationalities with respect to each
group's beneficial effect on land values. It listed race as a highly influential characteristic
in devaluing land. The most favored persons were English, Germans, Scotch, Irish, and
Scandinavians; the least favored were African Americans and Mexicans. Id. 2.02, at 2-5
to -6.
23 Lacayo, supra note 20, at 28.
24 See Thomas, supra note 2 (detailing statistical findings from the 1992 Boston
Federal Reserve Study as analyzed by the Wall Street Journal).
The term redlining also applies to insurance companies and their refusal to write
policies in low income areas. ROBERT B. HOLTOM, RESTRAINTS ON UNDERWRITING 68
(1979) (quoting Report of the Redlining Task Force of the D-2 Subcommittee of the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (Oct. 11, 1977)). These low income
areas are generally occupied exclusively or primarily by racial minorities, especially
African Americans. WILLIAM G. GRIGSBY & LOUIS ROSENBURG, URBAN HOUSING
POLICY 155, 166-67 (1975) (noting insurance company's refusal to write policies in inner
city, where population was two-thirds African American).
The denial of insurance coverage stills occurs, most notably in cities experiencing
wide-spread destruction. Such exclusion prevents the rebuilding of entire cities. An
example of such insurance redlining occurred following the destruction of Los Angeles
in the wake of the verdict of acquittal in the Rodney King beating. After the destruction
of the predominantly minority neighborhoods of South Central Los Angeles, insurance
companies paid the initial damages but declined to reinsure home and business owners.
Crusader Insurance, for one, notified 1200 people that riot coverage would be canceled.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REDLINING
C. Governmental Policies of Discrimination
Far more troubling than the prejudice of individuals is the prior
discrimination by the Federal Housing Authority (FHA).25 During the
early part of the twentieth century, the FHA engaged in overtly
discriminatory practices and embraced prejudicial policies.26 In 1948,
Assistant Authority Commissioner Lockwood stated that the FHA "has
never had a housing project of mixed occupancy. 27 The FHA policy of
single race projects remained in force until 1949, when the revised manual
excluded references to inharmonious racial groups.28
Although the Federal Housing Authority facially altered its policy in
1949,29 the effects of the FHAs prior policies were long-lived.3 ° Unable to
secure loans during government advocated segregation, minorities lacked
credit ratings and therefore were unable to gain access to funds after
The MacNeillLehrer NewsHour (PBS television broadcast, Apr. 7, 1993).
Redlining by insurance companies creates concern that the trend of withdrawing policy
coverage is based on racial prejudice, not on concern over the loss of profits. More
importantly for the purposes of this Note, the use of redlining in insurance may influence
real estate lending by negatively affecting the value of property. The inability to acquire
insurance on a parcel of land creates apprehension by lenders that the destruction of
uninsured property will result in complete forfeiture by the borrower. HOLTOM, supra, at
73. See also Peter Kerr, Riots Raise Concerns about Insurance Redlining, N.Y. TIMES,
May 4, 1992, at D2. "A lack of property insurance can strangle a neighborhood's
economy. Banks usually refuse to give mortgages on uninsured property ... ." Id. By
refusing to write policies in minority neighborhoods, insurance companies may be
instrumental in the devaluation of property within these neighborhoods, leading to
continued redlining in lending.
25 The Federal Housing Authority was established by the federal government to combat
the problems of the depression and to ignite the housing industry. The Authority
unconditionally guaranteed loans in an effort to prompt construction. CHARLES ABRAMS,
FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS: A STUDY OF PREJUDICE IN HOUSING 229 (1971).
26 The Federal Housing Authority insisted on racial homogeneity in areas where home
purchases were possible through federally guaranteed loans. The Authority's goals
included the prevention of infiltration by minorities and the enforcement of homogeneity
within neighborhoods. Id. at 230.
27 Letter from W. J. Lockwood to James Cassels, Executive Secretary, National Co-
operative Mutual Housing Association, Nov. 19, 1948, quoted in ABRAMS, supra note 25,
at 233.
28 ABRAMS, supra note 25, at 232-33.
29 The Authority's change to a non-discriminatory policy was not the result of free
choice by the government, but rather resulted from protests by citizens. Id. at 234.
30 Federal Housing Authority policy created a system under which almost all deeds
contained racial covenants. Id. By unofficially espousing segregation, the government
enabled the perpetuation of discrimination in housing long after the amendment of the
Federal Housing Authority manual. Id. Individuals once precluded from borrowing money
due to official discriminatory policies remained unable to secure loans and property.
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official segregation ended.3' The continued denial of loans created a
vicious cycle from which minorities were unable to escape.32
In 1993, if one compares equally qualified whites and African
Americans, African Americans are still more likely to be denied mortgages
for the purchase of a home.33 When mortgages are unobtainable, rents
increase. Unable to acquire ownership in a home, individuals are forced to
rely on landlords. Landlords with numerous tenants can increase rents and
" See Zuckoff, supra note 16, Economy, at 1 (stating that minorities tend to have
lower credit ratings and greater debt). Minorities are also less likely to have bank
accounts, partially due to the lack of deposit facilities within minority neighborhoods.
Thomas, supra note 2, at A8. Banks do not look favorably upon accepting large amounts
of cash for down payments, further compounding minority credit rating and lending
problems. Id. The denial of credit increases in importance as America becomes a society
dependent on deferred payment for goods and services. "Credit has become a functional
substitute for cash in our economy, and consequently credit decisions can greatly influence
an individual's economic choices." John H. Matheson, The Equal Credit Opportunity Act:
A Functional Failure, 21 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 371, 373 (1984). The denial of credit limits
access to consumer goods and capital investments, effectively placing a ceiling on an
individual's ability to achieve the "American Dream."
32 Since they could not secure loans for new homes outside of the city, African
Americans became victims of the shortage of urban housing. ABRAMS, supra note 25, at
237. This residential shortage in the cities further destroyed already run-down housing
facilities. Because minorities were forced to live in dilapidated areas without funds for
improvements, deterioration continued. See Marshall Ingwerson, Jackson Calls for More
Fiscal Stimulus, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 26, 1993, at 2. This disintegration became
a self-fulfilling prophecy, adding fuel to the fire of segregationists. See Alton Bennett,
Lending Practices Forcing Decay of Neighborhoods, STAR TRIB., Nov. 18, 1991, at 3D.
Such shortsightedness fails to realize that lending to minorities allows neighborhoods to
experience growth and development. It has been argued, however, that banks are merely
overlooking a potentially profitable area for lending, and should not be compelled to serve
these areas, but rather competition should rule the marketplace. See generally Lawrence
J. White, The Community Reinvestment Act: Good Intentions Headed in the Wrong
Direction, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 281, 282 (1993). Expanded growth and development
may allow communities to avoid what some believe is the inevitability of neighborhood
deterioration.
Sociologists believe that all neighborhoods will eventually reach a state of decline after
which reinvestment will lead to redevelopment. "The data provided by [the Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act] removes any doubt that redlining indeed exists, that many
credit-worthy areas are denied loans. This denial of credit, while it is certainly not the sole
cause of our urban problems, undoubtedly aggravates urban decline." 123 CONG. REC.
17,630 (1977) (statement of Sen. Proxmire).
" See Terrence O'Hara, She Proved Bank Redlining in Md., Now Anne Shlay to Study
Anew, WARFIELD'S Bus. REC., Oct. 2, 1992, § 1, at 3. (Shlay stated, "I found that all
other things being equal, race was an indicator of whether neighborhoods got credit.");
Jerd Smith, Banks Face Lending Complaints, DENV. Bus. J., Dec. 18, 1992, § 1, at 1
(looking at First Banking System's mortgage rates in Denver for applicants with annual
income of $36,000 to $40,000, and finding loan denial rates of 33% for African
Americans, 25% for Hispanics, and 10% for whites).
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decrease maintenance without losing inhabitants.34 This pattern describes
the plight of many minorities in America today.
III. BANKING REGULATION
Realizing the oppression created by denying individuals the right to
own property, Congress created a system of regulation for banks and
lending institutions. This system of anti-discrimination legislation is
interwoven with earlier legislation designed to ensure sound monetary
policy. A basic understanding of banking regulation is necessary for
determining whether banks can be held to a constitutional standard of
equal protection.
The current regulatory structure is largely a product of the New Deal
era.35 There were federal banking regulations as early as 1791, however,
when the first Bank of the United States was chartered.3 6 Chartered by the
federal government with capital from private and public sources, the first
bank lasted only as long as its twenty year charter." Prior to this time,
banks were chartered and controlled by state law. In 1816, the federal
government chartered a second bank.38 This, too, survived only through
its original charter.39 During the thirty years following the expiration of
the second Bank of the United States, the federal government was not
involved in banking regulation. ° Until after the Civil War, the currency
generated throughout the young nation differed greatly between
institutions.41
34 Bennett, supra note 32, at 3D.
35 Howard H. Hackley, Our Baffling Banking System, 52 VA. L. REv. 565, 577-80
(1966) (detailing development of modem bank regulations).
36 CARTER H. GOLEMBE & DAVID S. HOLLAND, FEDERAL REGULATION OF BANKING
1986-87, at 3 (1986).
37 Id. at 4.
38 Hackley, supra note 35, at 569-70.
31 Id. at 570. The renewal of the bank's charter was vetoed by President Jackson. Id.
40 GOLEMBE & HOLLAND, supra note 36, at 5.
" Id. at 6. Prior to the National Currency Act of 1863, state banks could issue
currency without regard for consistency with other states. Id. The National Currency Act
authorized the creation of national banks empowered to issue notes backed by government
bonds. The primary motive behind the National Currency Act was to finance the Civil
War. Hackley, supra note 35, at 570. The Union did not anticipate that the Confederacy
could withstand a long war and therefore felt intense economic pressure in the midst of
the Civil War that required the creation of a national currency to finance the war. See
Stephen J. Friedman & Connie M. Friesen, A New Paradigm for Financial Regulation:
Getting from Here to There, 43 MD. L. REV. 413, 414 (1984).
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In 1863, the federal government reentered bank regulation by creating
the current dual banking system.42 Enacted by a provision permitting the
chartering of national banks, the system allowed both state governments
and the federal government to charter financial institutions.43 Perhaps the
most crucial portion of this provision was the National Currency Act,44
which allowed federally-backed notes to be circulated.45 In 1863, part of
the National Bank Act created the position of Comptroller of the Currency
to oversee banking regulation.46
Until the 1913 passage of the Federal Reserve Act,47 the federal
government had little control over state chartered banks.48 Since the
enactment of the Federal Reserve Act, which regulates monetary policy for
a healthy national economy, the system of national regulation has
developed to encompass almost all banks.49 Until 1933, however, the
federal government lacked widespread supervision of state chartered
banks.5 ° In 1933, the Federal Deposit Insurance Act 5 ' was enacted,
42 GOLEMBE & HOLLAND, supra note 36, at 3. At the time of the passage of the
National Currency Act, the dual banking system was not an intended result. National
banks were intended to replace state banks and the state system entirely. Hackley, supra
note 35, at 571. See also GOLEMBE & HOLLAND, supra note 36, at 7 ("[Tlhe two banking
systems were at war, with each seeking the extermination of the other.").
43 GOLEMBE & HOLLAND, supra note 36, at 6.
4 Ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665 (1863).
45 GOLEMBE & HOLLAND, supra note 36, at 6. The National Currency Act initiated the
transition toward uniform currency, a necessity following the devaluation of Confederate
currency in the aftermath of the Civil War.
46 Hackley, supra note 35, at 571. The Comptroller was created to head a bureau
within the Treasury Department. The Comptroller was to execute laws respecting "the
issue and regulation of a national currency secured by United States bonds." 12 U.S.C.
§ 1 (1988). The Comptroller is responsible for bank charters and is the primary regulator
of national banks. GOLEMBE & HOLLAND, supra note 36, at 37. He serves as a member of
the Federal Reserve Board. The Board, however, reserves the power to alter decisions of
the Comptroller. Hackley, supra note 35, at 575.
The Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve Board, and the FDIC constitute
the three main regulators of banking in America. GOLEMBE & HOLLAND, supra note 36,
at 27.
47 12 U.S.C. §§ 221-552 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
48 Hackley, supra note 35, at 573. The Federal Reserve Act was the congressional
response to the financial hardship of the early part of the century. Designed to create more
effective supervision of banks, GOLEMBE & HOLLAND, supra note 36, at 8, the Act
created a regional system of bank monitoring. Hackley, supra note 35, at 574. The Federal
Reserve created reserve requirements effectively commanding that a certain percentage
of deposits be held, a necessity in light of the financial concerns of the early 1900s. Id.
49 See generally Hackley, supra note 35.
50 GOLEMBE & HOLLAND, supra note 36, at 8-9.
" 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1832 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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requiring all Federal Reserve banks to subscribe for deposit protection
offered by the Federal Deposit Insurance Company (FDIC).52
Although not all banks are members of the Federal Reserve, large scale
bank failure in the early 1930s made deposit insurance a necessity for all
banks, regardless of how they were chartered.53 Most banks, therefore,
voluntarily subjected themselves to the regulations of the FDIC.54 The
decision to charter under either the federal or state system is made by
carefully considering the applicable state and federal laws. The decision
under whose authority to incorporate is not irreversible, however. Banks
may reincorporate under a different jurisdiction, generally by vote of the
shareholders, provided that all applicable legal requirements are met.
55
In addition to the laws applicable to both state and national banks,
numerous laws pertain only to national banks.56 These laws comprise a
52 12 U.S.C. § 1815(a) (Supp. IV 1992).
13 GOLEMBE & HOLLAND, supra note 36, at 9. Although states had previously offered
deposit insurance, this was the first such offering by the federal government. Hackley,
supra note 35, at 577.
" Hackley, supra note 35, at 577-78. In 1985, there were 4976 national banks, 1070
state Federal Reserve member banks, 8425 nonmember insured banks, and 764 non-
insured banks. GOLEMBE & HOLLAND, supra note 36, at 285, table 2.
The current regulatory structure of the federal banking system consists of numerous
overlapping and interwoven policies. Banks are perhaps the most regulated industry in
America. The current banking scheme recognizes four types of banks, which belong to
two categories-national and state banks. See Hackley, supra note 35, at 566. This label
designates the governing body that granted the charter for the operation of the bank. The
state chartered banks are further categorized to include state member banks, non-member
insured banks, and uninsured banks. Id. The term "member" denotes participation in the
Federal Reserve program, a mandatory program for national banks. Id.
s 12 U.S.C. §§ 30, 35 (1988).
56 All national banks must receive their charters from the United States government,
id. § 27, and must include "national" within their name. Id. § 22. Unlike the chartering
of a corporation, the granting of a charter to a national bank requires compliance with a
variety of strict provisions. In the extensive regulatory structure of the federal banking
system, new national banks must have a specified amount of capital and surplus, though
the amount varies by location and population, and must continue to meet other delineated
standards to remain in business. Id. § 51. Real estate loans are also subject to regulation.
The Comptroller regulates the nature of acceptable collateral and the amount which may
be lent. 12 U.S.C. § 371(a) (Supp. IV 1992). National banks are also limited in the
amount available to any individual borrower. 12 U.S.C. § 84(a)(1) (1988).
Like all Reserve member banks, national banks are required to maintain reserves
against their deposits as specified by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System. 12 U.S.C. § 461 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). The Federal Reserve Act also limits
the amount of money that may be extended to officers and directors of the institution and
the purposes for which such funds may be lent. 12 U.S.C. § 375a (1988). Further
regulation under the Banking Act of 1933 requires that banks have no fewer than five and
no more than 25 directors. Id. § 71a. In addition, two-thirds of the directors must live
within 100 miles of the bank's location, and all directors must be United States citizens.
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complex system, which extensively governs national banks and severely
curtails their operating freedom." This comprehensive regulation is an
important aspect of proving national banks' constitutional accountability.
Although state chartered banks are subject to fewer federal
regulations,58 they are nonetheless highly regulated. State law restricts
Id. § 72. Banks may not affiliate with securities companies and are subject to sanctions
if found dealing in both securities and deposits. Id. § 37.
Banks, unlike corporations, are prohibited from expanding without governmental
permission. All banks covered by Federal Deposit Insurance must receive approval before
opening new branches, id. § 36, or merging with another institution. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992). No interest may be paid on demand deposits and checking
accounts. 12 U.S.C. § 371a (1988). The federal government also regulates the
advertisement of the rates for savings and time deposit accounts. 12 U.S.C. § 1831f(h)
(Supp. IV 1992). Federal bank supervisory agencies must grant permission for all insured
banks to reduce their capital stock. 12 U.S.C. §§ 59, 329 (1988). Beyond the scope of
daily activities, no bank may be acquired by a holding company without first being
granted permission by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve. 12 U.S.C. § 1842
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992). In addition to federal regulation, banks may also be restricted
by state law, but congressional permission must be granted before states may pass laws
affecting national banks. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) (holding that
states have no constitutional right to tax national banks, as national banks are entities of
the government).
57 In the early 1980s, it appeared that deregulation might occur within the banking
industry. The wide-spread failure of savings and loan institutions, however, seems to have
ended this trend. Developments in Banking Law: 1991, 11 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 1, 10-
12 (1992). In 1991, 127 banks failed or stayed in business only through the use of
government funds. Id. at 1.
58 Because state laws regulate general operations, the applicable federal law is less
extensive, though still significant. State banks may choose to become member banks by
joining the Federal Reserve. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve requires that
the banks maintain reserves of a certain percentage. 12 U.S.C. § 461(b)(2) (1988 & Supp.
IV 1992). State member banks may not affiliate with securities companies and may not
have interlocking directorates with other banks or with securities companies. 12 U.S.C..
§§ 377, 378 (1988). The state member banks are not subject to the federal limitation on
the amount available to one borrower. Id. § 329. See Hackley, supra note 35, at 587. All
member banks are required to subscribe to the protections of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Company. GOLEMBE & HOLLAND, supra note 36, at 9.
State banks that choose not to join the Federal Reserve, called non-member banks, may
still opt to be protected by the Federal Deposit Insurance Company, making them non-
member insured banks. Hackley, supra note 35, at 578. Because the need for deposit
protection is so great, the FDIC regulates almost all banks currently chartered in the
United States. GOLEMBE & HOLLAND, supra note 36, at 9. The FDIC protects deposits
in the event of bank failure. For example, in 1985, all of the 120 banks that closed due
to financial difficulties were insured by the FDIC. Id., at 113. Great latitude in
investigatory procedures exists to ensure that depositors are covered by the insurance. The
FDIC can arrange mergers with financially sound banks when banks are in distress and
place institutions in receivership. Id. at 112. The FDIC also holds broad investigatory
powers, id. at 40, in order to avoid large scale financial problems among member banks.
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banking in many ways, often by making the requirements for incorporation
more stringent than for corporations" and by setting requirements for
operation.6° Added to the regulations imposed by the federal government,
the burden on state banks is quite large.
IV. REGULATIONS AGAINST DISCRIMINATION
Although banking regulations are designed and implemented to further
the goal of fiscal responsibility, banks are also subject to laws requiring
disclosure and equal opportunity lending. Congress enacted anti-
discrimination legislation with an eye toward equal treatment for all
borrowers. Although anti-discrimination laws have existed in some form
since the 1860s, 6' a 1992 Federal Reserve study revealed that African
Americans are repeatedly denied mortgages, while similarly situated whites
receive loans. 62 Together, the anti-discrimination statutes create an
5 In California, for example, the character of the organizers and the need for additional
banking facilities are among the considerations to be made before granting a charter. CAL.
FIN. CODE § 361 (West 1989). The state also considers the character of the proposed
shareholders, an imposition far beyond the requirements prescribed for other businesses.
Id.
o In California, the state assesses all banks a portion of the money required for
funding the state's bank regulatory agency. CAL. FIN. CODE § 270 (West Supp. 1993).
Pursuant to California state law, all banks must provide funds for their annual examination
as well, and failure to pay on time can result in a bank losing its license to carry on
banking within the state. CAL. FIN. CODE § 273 (West 1989).
6' For example, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, §1, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as
amended in 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1988)) provided that:
[C]itizens, of every race and color.., shall have the same right, in every State and
Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, to be parties,
and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and
personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceeding for the
security of persons and property ....
Id.
The Act was designed to combat the vestiges of slavery by guaranteeing property and
contract rights. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 78 (1917). The Civil Rights Act
of 1875, which provided that "any person" who denied to any citizen the rights granted
in the Act could be civilly liable, ch. 114, § 2, 18 Stat. 336, 337 (1875), was not so well
received, however. In the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883), the Supreme Court
held that Congress could not enact legislation which prohibited private discrimination, as
there was no assignment of such powers under the Tenth Amendment, and no state action
was involved. Some theorists say the Court's decision indicates that "if a state did not
provide adequate protection through its common law, then there was state action sufficient
to justify federal intervention." Chemerinsky, -supra note 1, at 516.
62 Thomas, supra note 2. In 1991, mortgage rejection rates increased for all racial
groups. African Americans and Hispanics, however, were denied mortgages more often
during this period than were whites. Id. at Al.
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additional network for eradicating discrimination. This network has failed,
however, and additional legislation promises greater entanglement.
A. Title VIII: The Fair Housing Act
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, the Fair Housing Act,63
provides that it shall be illegal to deny a loan for purchasing, constructing,
improving, or repairing a dwelling on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,
handicap, or familial status.6 Blockbusting, the process of convincing
owners to sell because minorities are moving in, is also illegal, as is
steering minorities to areas traditionally occupied by minorities.65 The Fair
Housing Act grants primary authority to the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) to enforce these provisions.66 Unfortunately,
HUD failed to issue Title VIII regulations that sufficiently describe what
constitutes prohibited discrimination by lenders; therefore, lenders have no
standards to meet.67 This failure prevents progress toward equal treatment
in mortgage lending. HUD conducts few investigations into regulatory
compliance and lacks the necessary enforcement power to ensure
conformity with the statute.68
The lending disparity rate fluctuates between markets. In Boston, for
example, African American neighborhoods receive proportionally twenty-
63 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
64 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (1988).
65 Id. § 3604(e).
66 Id. § 3608(a). HUD's power, however, is limited to reconciliation through conference
and persuasion. No judicial remedy is authorized for HUD. Id. § 3610. HUD's authority,
in other words, is limited to attempts to extract voluntary compliance from lenders. If the
victim does not seek judicial remedy, the Secretary of HUD may refer the case to an
administrative law judge. Id. § 3612. The AU may order damages and assess civil
penalties. Id. § 3612(g)(3).
67 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL FAIR HousING ENFORCEMENT
EFFORT 5, 6 (1979) [hereinafter FAIR HOusING].
68 Id. Current statistics illustrate HUD's inability to demand compliance with federal
standards of equality. Thomas, supra note 2, at A8-A9. The Fair Housing Act, along with
all other federal anti-discrimination legislation, has been criticized repeatedly for its failure
to result in equal credit and loan opportunities. "The greatest problem underlying the
current housing situation.., is a weak fair housing law which has been ineffective in the
objective to eliminate housing discrimination." Michael Steven Bylsma, Note, Is the U.S.
Committed to Fair Housing? Enforcement of the Fair Housing Act Remains a Crucial
Problem, 29 CATH. U. L. REV. 641, 642 (1980). The creation of additional legislation
serves only to further entangle the web of regulations and fails to eradicate the problem
of discrimination. See generally White, supra note 32, at 283-84 (stating that
discriminatory banking practices that are the result of overt discrimination should be
addressed by tougher enforcement of anti-discrimination laws, not by the use of the
Community Reinvestment Act).
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four percent fewer home mortgage loans than white neighborhoods.6 9 In
Atlanta, a shocking 1988 study sparked widespread protest when it was
reported that four times as many loans were extended to white middle
income areas as African American middle income areas per single family
structure.7 ° Pursuant to the Civil Rights Act, individuals denied mortgages
may pursue individual redress regardless of whether HUD or the
Department of Justice chooses to pursue remedies against the financial
institution.7'
B. Equal Credit Opportunity Act
The Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) 72 attempts to provide
further safeguards for rights of minority loan applicants. The ECOA makes
it illegal for any creditor to discriminate on the basis of race.73 "The
ECOA assumes that consumer credit is a positive and necessary aspect of
our economy to which all qualified applicants should have equal
access." 74 The primary provision of the ECOA, Regulation B, 75 prohibits
69 Thomas, supra note 2, at Al.
70 Stephen A. Fuchs, Discriminatory Lending Practices: Recent Developments, Causes
and Solutions, 10 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 461, 469 (1991). The Department of Justice,
in response to the disparity reported in the Atlanta Journal and Constitution, initiated an
investigation into lending discrimination at city banks. Joseph D. Rich, Housing
Discrimination: The Enforcement Authority of the Department of Justice, 44 CONSUMER
FIN. L.Q. 256, 256 (1990). Only one lawsuit resulted from this investigation. The suit,
which was against Decatur Federal, resulted in a settlement between the bank and the
Federal Reserve Board. The settlement "mark[ed] the first time in U.S. history that a
financial institution has been hit with penalties for its mortgage lending activities." Jim
King, Decatur Federal to Settle Mortgage Bias Case; Thrift to Reimburse Those Affected,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., Sept. 17, 1992, at Dl. Decatur Federal's lending ratio was 3.72.
Id.
71 Individuals may first apply to HUD for relief within thirty days of the discriminatory
action. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1988). HUD then seeks voluntary conciliation by the lender.
If HUD is unsuccessful, the Department of Justice may take over and seek judicial relief
against the lender. Id. § 3614.
72 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). The original version of the
ECOA was designed to protect against sex and marital status discrimination. The
prohibition against racial discrimination was added in 1976. Matheson, supra note 31, at
371.
13 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1) (1988). The ECOA was designed to shield certain consumers
from discriminatory credit practices on the basis of nonpredictive factors, including race.
Matheson, supra note 31, at 372.
74 Matheson, supra note 31, at 372.
71 12 C.F.R. §§ 202.1-202.14 (1993).
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creditors from requesting any information with respect to race for use in
lending decisions.76
The ECOA is enforced by a number of agencies overseen by the
Federal Trade Commission.77 The Attorney General is authorized to
pursue civil actions, either independently or upon referral.78 The ECOA
allows for a private civil suit when a creditor is engaged in a pattern or
practice of discrimination.79 Like its predecessors and its followers, the
ECOA provided great hope, and subsequently, vast disappointment to
optimistic minority borrowers.8 °
C. Community Reinvestment Act
Under the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA),8' regulated
financial institutions must demonstrate that their deposit facilities serve the
76 Id. § 202.5(d)(5). This information, however, is reported for purposes of evaluating
the success of the ECOA, effectively allowing creditors access to the disallowed
information, which may then be the actual basis for the denial of a loan. Matheson, supra
note 31, at 374 n.15.
Applicants denied credit must be informed of their right to request a report detailing
the reason for the denial of credit. 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(a)(2)(ii) (1993). Once requested, the
report must be furnished by the financial institution. Id.
77 15 U.S.C. § 1691c(c) (1988). The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve is
charged with promulgating regulations for enforcement of the ECOA. Id. § 1691b(a).
Further enforcement is entrusted to federal agencies, while the Federal Trade Commission
oversees the entire enforcement effort.
78 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(h) (Supp. IV 1992). The Attorney General received such
"heightened" powers as a result of complaints that the original act lacked sufficient
compliance mechanisms. Matheson, supra note 31, at 376.
'9 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(b) (1988). Congress anticipated that private enforcement would
be through class action suits and that such suits would provide the impetus for overall
enforcement. S. REP. NO. 898, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1976). Private suits, however, are
few and far between. The plaintiff in an ECOA based suit carries a heavy burden of proof
of both discrimination and actual damages. Scott Ilgenfritz, The Failure of Private Actions
as an ECOA Enforcement Tool: A Call for Active Governmental Enforcement and
Statutory Reform, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 447, 457 (1984). See generally Matheson, supra
note 31, at 378 (stating that lack of minimum damages creates a disincentive for private
suits-victory guarantees no minimum return).
8 "Creditors ... must now refrain from utilizing traditional credit standards unless
the criteria can be shown to be objective, equally applied, and determinative of
creditworthiness. Hopefully, the antidiscrimination provisions of ECOA will work to erode
the apparent credit discrimination which now exists in our society." Susan Anderson, The
Antidiscrimination Provisions of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 12 UCC L.J. 248, 255
(1980).
The ECOA, like the Communiiy Reinvestment Act, provided little relief to minorities.
Between 1977 and 1984, fewer than fifty cases were reported under the ECOA, although
17,000 violations were found by the Federal Reserve Board during an eighteen month
period. Matheson, supra note 31, at 377-78 (citations omitted).
83 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2907 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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needs of the community in which they do business.82 The CRA, "the
natioris major anti-redlining law,"83 received criticism for its failure to
require compliance during the first decade after its enactment.
8 4
Unfortunately, little has been done toward enforcement, with few specific
regulations to guide banks in the early years. In the early 1980s, banks
with low minority lending ratios received approval to open new branches
and merge with other banks.8 6
No private cause of action exists under the CRA. Rather, the Act
denies bank growth and development in an effort to demand equal
treatment of all customers.87 The primary source of CRA enforcement,
however, is provided by community organizations seeking to prevent
continued violations of the CRA.88 A primary congressional motive
behind the CRA was to assure that community members, especially
minorities, have access to loans.8 9 Banks, however, have complained
82 12 U.S.C. § 2903 (Supp. IV 1992). The Act requires federal supervisory agencies
to decide whether the bank fulfills community needs before approving an "application for
a deposit facility," id., which includes extensions and mergers. Id. § 2902(3)(C), (E).
"The CRA is premised upon the view that although they are privately capitalized, banks
... are subject to underlying charter obligations to serve the banking needs of the local
community." Allen J. Fishbein, The Community Reinvestment Act after 15 Years: It
Works, but Strengthened Federal Enforcement Is Needed, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 293,
293 (1993).
83 Peter Dreier, America's Urban Crisis: Symptoms, Causes, Solutions, 71 N.C. L. REV.
1351, 1381 (1993).
84 In the 1988 Senate Rehearings on enforcement of the CRA, Senator Proxmire said,
"Regulators seem to think that we're all living in Lake Woebegone. Like children of the
fictional village, U.S. lenders are all above average." Hearings Before the Senate Comm.
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1988).
85 Mario Alvarado, Revisiting the Community Reinvestment Act in an Era of Mergers
and Acquisitions, 12 ANN. REv. BANKING L. 475, 479-84 (1993). There is no defined
process for regulatory investigation. Rather, applications for mergers and expansions must
be submitted to the appropriate regulatory agency. These agencies consider the bank's
minority lending ratios as part of the application process. Richard Marsico, A Guide to
Enforcing the Community Reinvestment Act, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 165, 171 (1993).
86 Alvarado, supra note 85, at "482 n.47.
87 See Harambee Uhuru School, Inc. v. Kemp, No. C2-90-949, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15125, at *11 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 1992) (holding that the CRA does not "authorize a
private individual to file suit or pursue other remedies for violation of any of the
provisions of the Act").
88 See generally Marsico, supra note 85 (offering a guide for enforcement of the CRA,
aimed at community based groups, and detailing strategies for exacting compliance).
89 During the initial debate on the CRA, Senator Proxmire said, "[C]onvenience and
needs does not just mean drive-in teller windows and Christmas Club accounts. It means
loans." 123 CONG. REC. 17,630 (1977).
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that compliance with the CRA is overly burdensome and seek to
avoid compliance. 90 Bankers deny the existence of mortgage discrimi-
nation.9 These attempts failed to gain support within Congress, and thus
all banks are required to comply with the Act.
92
D. Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
To effectuate compliance with these anti-discrimination laws, Congress
enacted the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA)93 in 1975. The
HMDA requires banks with offices in metropolitan areas to reveal publicly
the information regarding the geographic distribution of loans for home
purchase and improvement. 94 In 1991, Congress amended the HMDA to
require the compilation and publication of information regarding all
applications, not just loans granted. 95 The HMDA requires that the race,
national origin, gender, and annual income of all applicants be reported
annually.96 This information forms the basis for investigations into the
lending practices of banks. The Federal Reserve, however, warns against
over-reliance on the statistics in forming a presumption of
discrimination.97
90 Alvarado, supra note 85, at 481. Bank complaints are supported by the lack of
congressional or regulatory guidelines outlining whether a community's credit needs have
been met. Marsico, supra note 85, at 171. Additionally, arguments have been made that
"[either the CRA] is redundant, because serving the local community is profitable
anyway; or it requires cross-subsidy, with above-normal profits from other services
subsidizing the losses from the unprofitable service to the local community .... CRA
obligations will cause banks to try to exit unprofitable communities completely ... "
White, supra note 32, at 282.
9" Chip Reichhart of the Maryland Mortgage Banker's Association stated, "I've been
in the business for 20 years . . . . I've never seen any overt acts of discriminaton. We are
concerned that there's a perception that our industry discriminates .... Terrence O'Hara,
Mortgage Bankers Air Reforms, DAILY REC., Sept. 17, 1992, § 1, at 1.
92 Thomas, supra note 2, at A8. See also Susannah B. Goodman, Keep Reins Tight on
Banks, CHRISTIAN Sc. MONITOR, Mar. 11, 1993, at 19. Fifteen years after its enactment,
the CRA continues to receive criticisms from both sides for being over burdensome and
ineffective. But see White, supra note 32, at 283 (asserting that the relative absence of
CRA complaints from effective communities indicates no lending problem).
93 12 U.S.C §§ 2801-2810 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
9' Id. § 2803. Three types of loans are covered by the HMDA: home purchase, home
refinancing, and home improvement loans. 12 C.F.R. § 203.4(a) (1993) (defined in 12
C.F.R. § 203.2(f), (g) (1993)).
9' 12 U.S.C. § 28030) (Supp. IV 1992).
96 Id. § 2803(b)(4).
" Thomas, supra note 2, at A8.
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V. REMEDYING DISCRIMINATION IN LENDING
Unfortunately, the laws designed to prevent discrimination have failed
to fulfill their goals. Statistics show the continued presence of prejudicial
behavior by banks toward racial minorities. 98 The federal government,
despite numerous laws and agencies, has failed to eradicate discrimination
in lending. In a hearing of the Consumer Subcommittee of the Senate
Banking Committee, Senator Dixon of Illinois stated:
[I]ts 21 years since passage of the Fair Housing Act. Fifteen
years since the Equal Credit Opportunity Act was passed in
the Congress, and 11 years since the Community
Reinvestment Act became the law of this land, and still we
have discrimination in lending. The problem today is not
lack of laws, in my view, it is lack-luster enforcement. 99
To eradicate discrimination in housing, greater demands must be placed on
both banks and the government. To ensure protection of the rights due to
all people under the United States Constitution, a new standard must be
created for eliminating racial lines in lending.
The current banking regulatory structure fails to offer redress to victims
of redlining. A greater standard of accountability is necessary to prevent
the continued use of redlining. A constitutional standard allowing
individuals remedies would shift the problem of redlining from the hands
of executive regulatory agencies to the judiciary. Such a standard would
also reform bank procedures to create objective lending criteria. A change
in analysis is necessary, as the current problem extends far beyond the
limits redressable within the existing regulatory scheme. Through use of
strict scrutiny review, the remedies available to victims of redlining would
not be limited to damages, but would also include an overhaul of the
mortgage-lending process.
98 Id. While whites comprise 75.2% of the United States population, they account for
85.8% of the mortgage loans approved. African Americans constitute 12.1% of the
population and receive only 4.8% of the mortgages granted. Edward P. Foldessy, How the
Mortgage Lending Pie Is Divided, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 1992, at A8 (graph). The
Department of Justice commented that the vast disparities in lending ratios "are
statistically significant, could not have occurred by chance, and cannot be explained by
differences in the relative qualifications of white applicants and black applicants for
mortgage loans, or other non-racial factors." Thomas, supra note 2, at A9.
99 Discrimination in Home Mortgage Lending: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Consumer and Regulatory Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1989).
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The United States Constitution states that no person shall be deprived
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.l °° "[N]or shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws."'0 ' The Constitution protects individual rights, such as the
right to property, from governmental intrusion. Constitutional analysis
affords individual rights the greatest protection. The utilization of a
constitutional standard for equal protection, however, is much easier said
than done.
Equal protection claims arise under the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause. Under
each amendment the analysis is the same, the only difference being
whether the actor is the federal government or a state government.10 2
VI. THE STATE ACTOR DOCTRINE
The United States Constitution offers no redress for discriminatory acts
by private actors, no matter how wrongful.103 In order to find that a bank
has violated the United States Constitution by virtue of redlining, it is first
necessary to find either that the bank is a state actor or that the
government has acted in a discriminatory fashion. Originating in the latter
part of the nineteenth century, the state actor doctrine has created
considerable confusion and argument. °4 The state actor requirement
remains an important issue in constitutional analysis, however. Professor
Charles Black commented that the state actor requirement "is the most
important problem in American law. We cannot think about it too
much." 0 5 Although not members of any branch of the government,
banks are not strictly private actors. By virtue of their essential role in
American life, banks are in essence extensions of the government.
State actor analysis lacks predictability. Three main tests, however,
have developed.'0 6 The symbiotic relationship test seeks to establish state
10o U.S. CONST. amend. V.
101 U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
02 Miller v. Hartwood Apartments, Ltd., 689 F.2d 1239, 1243 (5th Cir. 1982).
103 See Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 461 (1952) (stating that the Fifth
Amendment applies only to actions of the federal government).
"o The doctrine is believed to have originated in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3,
11 (1883). No private cause of action arose under the Fourteenth Amendment, as courts
believed that common law protected individuals from the discriminatory acts of private
citizens or organizations. Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 511-14.
105 Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection and California's
Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 70 (1967).
" See generally Miller v. Indiana Hosp., 562 F. Supp. 1259 (W.D. Pa. 1983)
(outlining the symbiotic relations test, the nexus test, and the public functions test as the
standards for determining the existence of a state actor).
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involvement by showing that the allegedly private entity and the
government are so intertwined that the actions of one are attributable to the
other. The nexus test requires that the government involvement in
discriminatory activity be in the form of encouragement. When the
government allows or creates a situation where discrimination can occur,
a private entity may be found to be a state actor. The final test is the
public functions test. If a private actor fulfills a role generally reserved for
the sovereign, the private actor may not act in a manner in which the
government is forbidden from acting.
A. Symbiotic Relationship Test
The first test is the symbiotic relationship test. 0 7 The symbiotic test
looks for an overall interdependence between a private enterprise and a
governmental entity. 0 8 If the relationship between the two is mutually
beneficial, then the private enterprise, for the purpose of constitutional
interpretation, may be considered a state actor.'0 9 This status is based on
a significant interrelationship resulting in the appearance that the two
organizations are one."0 Once an interrelationship is established, it is not
necessary for the individual plaintiff to show that the government is
involved in the specific challenged action."' In the case of banking,
extensive government regulation increases the possibility that a court
would find banks to be state actors. Federal regulations touch all aspects
of banking, from the formation and closure of banks to their growth and
daily activity.
1. Does Regulation Equal "Interrelated"?
Extensive regulation of an organization is generally not enough to find
that a private group is a governmental actor." 2 The relationship between
banks and the federal government, however, goes far beyond what is
normally construed as regulation." 3 "Few other enterprises in the U.S.
economy are saddled with the obligation to serve their local
107 Id. at 1275.
08 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961).
'o Miller, 562 F. Supp. at 1275.
"o Burton, 365 U.S. at 725.
". Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 545 F.2d 382, 385 (3d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1052 (1978).
112 Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 171-79 (1972).
113 See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
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communities."' 4 When the nature of the governmental involvement
extends beyond mere regulation, the actor may be held to the constitutional
responsibilities of the state. 115
The federal government participates even more fully in banking
activities by depositing federal money in banks. Banks derive substantial
benefits from these deposits, and much of this money applies toward the
making of loans, especially mortgages.'1 6 Under HUD, the government
backs loans made to low income applicants, thus increasing bank revenues
and ensuring loan repayment." 7 The bank collects fees and interest on the
loans while enjoying the security that accompanies a guaranteed loan.
Although the government does not supply the physical facilities for
banking, it provides for and regulates almost all other aspects. This
dependency relationship-banks relying on governmental permission and the
government relying on banks to assist in the management of sound fiscal
policy-satisfies the requirements of the state actor doctrine set forth by the
Supreme Court in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority." 8
In Burton, a private restaurant located within a public parking garage
was deemed a state actor." 9 The restaurant was "physically and
financially [an] integral" part of a public building, which was maintained
with public funds. 20 The Court also held that state action is prohibited
through any arrangement, including management, funds, or property.' 2'
Although banks are not usually located in publicly owned buildings,
they are financially dependant upon the government. From deposit
insurance and federally backed loans to the printing and circulation of
114 White, supra note 32, at 287.
"' See Havas v. Communications Workers of Am., 509 F. Supp. 144, 148-49 (N.D.
N.Y. 1981) (holding labor union to constitutional standard due to intertwining of federal
government and labor organizations).
116 FAIR HOUSING, supra note 67, at 212.
117 12 U.S.C. § 1702 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). The federal government, in return for
such security, asks that banks provide lending opportunities to all communities, a "quid
pro quo" arrangement. Fishbein, supra note 82, at 293.
118 365 U.S. 715 (1961). The Court stated, "Only by sifting facts and weighing
circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be
attributed its true significance." Id. at 722.
"Banks and bankers occupy a unique place in our society and economy. Bankers are,
in effect, custodians of the economic resources of millions of citizens." FDIC Report on
Preferential Bank Lending: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1978) (statement of Comptroller of the Currency
John G. Heimann).
" Burton, 365 U.S. at 726.
120 Id. at 723.
121 Id. at 725. "By its inaction, the Authority, and through it the State, has not only
made itself a party to the refusal of service, but has elected to place its power, property
and prestige behind the admitted discrimination." Id.
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currency, banks would be unable to function without government
assistance. The government determines whether communities are served by
particular branches, and the extent of government permission necessary for
banks to function is indicative of a relationship built upon mutual
dependence.22 Without government insurance, financing, and fiscal
policy, banks would have a difficult time surviving. By limiting the
number and location of bank branches, the government shields banks from
the competitive forces of the market.
23
Unlike in ordinary corporations, the effect of bank failure is felt by
individuals outside of the ring of investors. Taxpayers and depositors share
in the losses of failed financial institutions. Often, due to deposit insurance,
the taxpayers carry the greatest load. "[Bankg] well-being concerns not
only the stockholders, but the depositors and public at large."'' 24
Pursuant to the symbiotic relationship test, there is no requirement that
,the government actually participate in the discriminatory activity.25 There
would be no need, therefore, for plaintiffs to show that the regulatory
agencies required, requested, or encouraged the racial discrimination.
Although the government provides both funds, through deposits, and
insurance, this is not necessary for a showing that a private party is a state
actor pursuant to the symbiotic relationship test.
2. The Symbiotic Relationship Test and State Banks
State banks, although subject to substantial regulation, are less likely
to be state actors pursuant to the symbiotic relationship test. Although
subject to regulation at the federal and state level, state banks are not
likely restrained by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The
Fourteenth Amendment, however, may apply. The Equal Protection Clause
binds individual states to non-discriminatory behavior. In order to hold
state banks responsible under equal protection, therefore, it is first
necessary to find that state chartered banks are instruments of the
122 See supra notes 56, 58. Additionally, a government charter "conveys numerous
economic benefits and in return it is legitimate for public policy and regulatory practice
to require some public purpose ...." 123 CONG. REC. 1958 (1977) (statement of Sen.
Proxmire concerning the CRA).
123 Mann et al., supra note 16, at 180. Congress has now decided to remove this shield
in the area of savings accounts by allowing the advertisement of interest rates for such
accounts. Id. at 17-18. Such advertisements are constrained by requirements of the Truth
in Savings Act. 12 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4313 (Supp. IV 1992).
124 German Baptist Orphans' Home v. Union Banking Co., 13 F. Supp. 814, 816 (W.D.
Mich. 1935).
125 Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 545 F.2d 382, 385 (3d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1052 (1978).
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chartering state. This relationship can be explored by looking at state
regulations on banking.
Only state regulations applying to state banks, however, may be
considered in determining whether a bank is an instrumentality of the
particular state. 26 The relationship between fiscal management and the
extensive dependency upon the state government, which exists between
the federal government and national banks, is missing. If a relationship
between the fiscal policies could be established, it could create a state
actor responsible under the Fourteenth Amendment.
State banks are also subject to statutory restraints on discriminatory
lending. Numerous state statutes contain provisions prohibiting
discrimination in lending. 27 Unfortunately these laws, which are similar
to Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act, have failed minorities much like their
federal counterparts.12' These regulations increase the likelihood that
banks may be considered actors of the state. Such protections must be
accompanied, however, by state constitutional protections mirroring the
Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.
B. The Nexus Test
If the symbiotic relationship test fails, the nexus test should be applied
in an attempt to find state action. 29 The question in the nexus test is
126 Federal regulations would tie a bank to the federal government and the Due Process
Clause. State banks, in order to fall under the guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause,
must be found to be actors of the state in which they operate. This relationship would
require a tie between the state bank and the state government which parallels the
relationship between national banks and the federal government.
127 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36-445 (1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6-1 (1989);
MASS. GEN. L. ch. 183, § 64 (1991); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.147a (1991); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 213.045 (1993); NEV. REV. STAT. § 207.310 (1992); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 9-f
(McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1992).
128 The poor lending ratios in these states indicate a lack of enforcement or
effectiveness. The ratios for states with legislation similar to the CRA had the following
lending ratios for 1991: Connecticut, 2.60; Georgia, 2.46; Massachussetts, 2.23; Michigan,
2.27; Missouri, 2.35; Nevada, 1.58; and New York, 2.16. Edward P. Foldessy, State by
State: How Blacks and Whites Compare, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 1992, at A8 (table). Each
state's 1991 statistics show a decreasing disparity in lending rates, but this may be the
result of an increase in enforcement at the federal level. Thomas, supra note 2, at A9.
Some states have stepped up enforcement, however, especially Massachussetts.
Nevertheless, the disparity in lending continues, and each governmental unit attempts to
pass the blame regarding enforcement of anti-discrimination laws. "Contrasting
approaches-a nudge from the Fed and a slap from [Massachussetts Attorney General]
Harshbarger-has highlighted a longstanding conflict over the best way to guarantee that
minorities have equal access to credit." Mitchell Zuckoff, Carrot or Stick in Lending Bias
Fight?, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 9, 1992, Economy, at 77.
129 See Miller v. Indiana Hosp., 562 F. Supp. 1259, 1275-78 (W.D. Pa. 1983)
(including suggested order of advancing through the three state actor tests). The Supreme
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whether "there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the
challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may
be fairly treated as that of the State itself."'' 30 The nexus test requires a
plaintiff to show that the government is so involved in the specific act at
issue that it has effectively encouraged the activity.' 3' It is not enough that
the government merely approve of the activity.' 32 Yet the governments
involvement need not be direct or extensive.
1. Governmental Ratification of Discriminatory Behavior
.The primary case under the nexus test is Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co.'33 In Jackson, the Court held that a private utility company
was not a state actor and therefore was not bound by the procedural due
process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. 34 The Court
rejected petitionefs claim that because the state regulated utility company
rates, the company was necessarily a state actor. 35 Petitioner claimed that
a commissionls consideration of the compan2s tariff procedures was
equivalent to approval of the activity; the Court disagreed.
36
In banking, the government has done more than approve of the
discriminatory activity. The Community Reinvestment Act requires that
different governmental agencies grant permits for merger and branch
openings.13' The granting of permits is based upon ratings regarding non-
Court, however, refuses to designate any test for analyzing the state actor doctrine. Burton
v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
130 Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).
131 Id. at 357; Fitzgerald v. Mountain Laurel Racing, Inc., 607 F.2d 589, 595 (3d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 956 (1980).
132 See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982). Extensive governmental
regulation alone is not sufficient to establish a nexus, but an entity bound by such
regulation is more likely to be a state actor than an entity which is not so regulated.
Jackson, 419 U.S. at 350-51.
13' 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
114 Id. Jackson claimed that because New York's tariff law granted the utility company
the right to terminate power service under certain conditions, the government was
implicated in the transaction, and due process was therefore necessary. Id. at 348. The
court disagreed and held that the mere granting of a monopoly was not sufficient to show
a state actor. Id. at 351.
' Id. at 350.
136 Id. at 354.
131 12 U.S.C. § 2903 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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discriminatory loan disbursement.1 38 The failure of federal agencies to
ensure compliance results in the encouragement and continuation of past
discriminatory policies.
The policies of the CRA in denying permits fall short of the regulation
necessary to ensure that discrimination does not occur. Chairman
Gonzalez, opening the field hearing on the CRA on September 29, 1989,
stated that "[tihe Community Reinvestment Act ... has become a
monument to regulatory inaction."1 39 The lack of governmental
enforcement also affects the ability of those discriminated against to seek
redress, as individuals are often unaware that they have been
victimized.' 4°
Federal agencies appear unconcerned with the discrimination occurring
in the mortgage industry. In 1988, a member of the Federal Reserve Board
of Governors said, "[i]ts not our job to allocate the credit geographically.
We dorit have hard and fast lines on that.' 4' Although Congress enacted
several laws requiring compliance and regulation, the agencies to which
this responsibility was delegated failed to act within the required scope of
the regulations, further expressing to banks that nondiscriminatory policies
are not required. 4
2
Although failure to ensure compliance is not an overt act of
discrimination, the government has done more than merely ignore the
problem. Congress specifically designed the CRA to eliminate
redlining. 43 Initially, banks had no concern regarding enforcement
because no standards existed by which to judge compliance. In the first
twelve years of the CRA, ninety-seven percent of the rated institutions
received one of the two highest ratings,' 44 and only eight of 50,000
merger and expansion applications submitted were rejected.145 It is
impossible to believe that these ratings reflect the reality of mortgage
lending. The statistics taken from the 1992 Boston Federal Reserve study
show lending bias, both before and after the elimination of non-racial
factors. 4 6 Although the situation is improving, the decision to grant a
138 See supra notes 82, 85.
139 Fuchs, supra note 70, at 479-80 (quoting Discriminatory Mortgage Lending
Patterns: Field Hearing Before the House Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1989)).
'40 Id. at 474.
141 Id. at 480 (citation omitted).
142 Id. at 479-82.
143 Alvarado, supra note 85, at 477.
144 Tomes, supra note 11, at 232.
145 id.
146 The Boston Federal Reserve study removed all controlling economic factors. These
included average income, the housing market, the mortgage market, neighborhood
property characteristics, mobility, and development. Fuchs, supra note 70, at 467.
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permit to merge or to open a new branch is usually challenged by citizen
action groups, not the government. 47 In essence, the regulatory structure
of the federal government allows mortgage discrimination to continue.
The government further fostered an atmosphere ripe for racial
discrimination through the discriminatory legislative and judicial policies
of the early twentieth century. As late as 1916, local ordinances required
segregation by race in residential neighborhoods. 48 Throughout the 1930s,
the Federal Housing Authority utilized discriminatory practices that
allowed prejudice to continue long after the agency policies changed. 149 It
is possible that the state action allows banks to continue to branch and
develop without requiring compliance with the CRA and other anti-
discrimination legislation. The question remains whether the granting of a
permit to a discriminatory body is unconstitutional. 50
Answering this question diverts the analysis from the banks liability
and places responsibility on the governmental agency that fails to act.
Banks then have no incentive to end discrimination or affirmatively work
to avoid discriminatory lending rates unless agencies formulate and enforce
rigid anti-discrimination requirements. Although this is a potential solution
to the problem of discriminatory lending, it fails to address the direct
prevention of discriminatory banking policies. As a result, this position
shall not be explored further.
"47 See Mann et al., supra note 16, at 70.
148 See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (addressing ordinance that prevented
lease or sale by a white person to a minority).
149 State action may be found in official failure to protect private rights. See McCabe
v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 235 U.S. 151, 160-62 (1914) (indicating that
if an individual is denied service based on race under authority of state law, he may
properly complain about the violation of constitutional law).
Although Congress enacted protective legislation, it took twenty years for Congress to
realize that the system had failed. This type of inaction is deliberate. The state has a duty
to ensure equal access to property in terms of access to funds.
15' See generally Barbara Rook Snyder, Private Motivation, State Action and the
Allocation of Responsibility for Fourteenth Amendment Violations, 75 CORNELL L. REV.
1053 (1993) (discussing that government failure to prevent discrimination is obviously
state action). But see Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 886
(1987) ("When the government fails to provide protection against private racial
discrimination, the failure is said not to be 'state action' and thus raises no constitutional
question.").
In Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1948), the Supreme Court held that a court
order enforcing a racially restrictive covenant would provide the state action necessary for
constitutional analysis. Regulatory action should fall under the same standards.
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2. Banks as Quasi-Public Actors
Banks have also been labeled quasi-public actors by the federal courts.
In Knickerbocker Life Insurance. Co. v. Pendleton,5' the Supreme Court
stated, "A bank is a quasi-public institution ... directly affecting the
financial transactions of the general public.' 52 This relationship is based
upon the extent of control that banks have over the financial well-being of
the national economy.
Federally chartered banks are more likely to be held to be actors of the
federal government by virtue of the Supremacy Clause. 53 In the landmark
decision of McCulloch v. Maryland,'54 involving the National Bank of
the United States, the Supreme Court established that federally chartered
banks are instrumentalities of the federal government. 55 McCulloch,
however, involved the National Bank of the United States rather than a
bank merely chartered by the federal government. This difference presents
no problem, as federal courts have upheld the theory that federal banks are
instrumentalities of the government long after the expiration of the
National Bank of the United States. 5 6 The question whether banks are
instrumentalities of the federal government generally arises when states
attempt to tax national banks. Based upon the Courts ruling in McCulloch,
unless specifically authorized by Congress, states may not regulate banks
in any way that interferes with federal regulation. 5 7
The Supreme Court extended the nexus test in Department of
Employment v. United States, 58 by stating that the American Red Cross,
like banks, is exempt from state taxation because it is an instrument of the
government. 59 Justice Fortas stated:
... 115 U.S. 339 (1885). See also Van Reed v. People's Nat'l Bank of Lebanon, 198
U.S. 554 (1905).
152 Pendleton, 115 U.S. at 344.
153 U.S. CONST. art. VI. The Supremacy Clause prevents the application of state laws
when they "stand[ I as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
Congress, however, cannot exceed the limits of its power under the Tenth Amendment.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 423 (1819).
114 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
1 The state, within which a branch of the National bank may settle, cannot, without
violating the Constitution, tax that branch. Id. at 429.
156 See Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Fairweather, 263 U.S. 103, 106 (1923); United Mo.
Bank of Kansas City, N.A. v. Danforth, 394 F. Supp. 774, 785 (W.D. Mo. 1975).
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 430. The Supremacy Clause, Article VI of the United States
Constitution, states that all laws pursuant to the Constitution, made under the authority of
the United States, shall be the "supreme Law of the Land" and are legally superior over
conflicting state laws. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
158 385 U.S. 355 (1966).
5 Id. at 360.
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In those respects in which the Red Cross differs from the
usual government agency-e.g., in that its employees are not
employees of the United States, and that government
officials do not direct everyday affairs-the Red Cross is
like other institutions-e.g., national banks-whose status as
tax-immune instrumentalities of the United States is beyonddispute. 160
National bank position as instrumentalities of the federal government
makes them quasi-public actors that, under the nexus test, could be found
to be state actors.
3. State Banks and the Nexus Test
Absent a showing of encouragement or authorization of discrimination
by the state, state banks likely will not be held to be state actors. The main
source of anti-discrimination regulation is the federal government, not the
state government.' 6' Anti-discrimination laws are in effect in many state
jurisdictions, however. A majority of these laws dictate that no
discrimination shall occur in the determination of housing loans on the
basis of race. 62 The state systems of regulation are substantially less
extensive than that of the federal government. 63
In order to bind state banks under the Fourteenth Amendment, it is
necessary to find that, by ignoring the deplorable minority lending ratio,
state governments have encouraged discriminatory lending. The argument
in this context is less convincing than in the federal realm, as state statutes
generally lack the intricate "enforcement" mechanisms in place at the
federal level.' 64
160 id.
161 See supra text accompanying notes 61-97.
162 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-52a (West Supp. 1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-
2414(a), (b) (1992); MASS. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 167, § 14 (West Supp. 1993); N.Y. EXEC.
LAW § 296-a (McKinney 1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 4112.02(h) (effective Jan. 1,
1994); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 30.04.510 (West 1986); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 31A-8B-
1 (1988).
163 Although states have enacted anti-discrimination statutes, the largest enforcement
mechanism available in this realm is through use of HMDA information. The HMDA
provides information about banks in large metropolitan areas. Although such information
can then be transferred to the states for use in enforcing state laws, banks in rural areas
are not required to comply. See 12 U.S.C. § 2803 (Supp. IV 1992) (addressing only banks
in metropolitan areas).
'64 There are, however, certain instances in which states are directly responsible for
creating "state actors" due to legislative enactments. In citizen referendum Proposition
14, under the guise of amending its Constitution, California granted citizens the right to
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C. The Public Functions Test
The third test utilized by the Supreme Court in determining whether
the state actor requirement is met is the public functions test.165 If the
private actor fulfills a role typically reserved for the government, then
constitutional provisions for equality may be applied to the actor.1 66 It
is not enough that a public benefit exists or that the goal of the activity is
the public good. 67 Instead, the activity typically must be undertaken
exclusively by the sovereign. 168 Because of the short-lived existence of
the National Bank of America, it is difficult to imagine that banks fulfill
a function typically reserved for the government. Looking again at
McCulloch, however, banks may be the governments chosen method of
achieving goals relegated solely to the government.
1. Allocation of Funds
One primary legislative function is the allocation of funds. In
McCulloch, the Supreme Court stated that:
A bank is a proper and suitable instrument to assist the
operations of the government, in the collection and
disbursement of the revenue; in the occasional anticipations
of taxes and imposts; and in the regulation of the actual
currency, as being a part of the trade and exchange between
the states. 16
9
sell or lease property to anyone they chose. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 26 (repealed 1974). The
proposition allowed discrimination based on race by permitting landlords to cancel leases
of minority tenants and by permitting denial of sale to minorities, which essentially
created government-endorsed private discrimination. This legislation created hundreds of
"state actors, because everyone who engaged in practices under Proposition 14 was acting
with the government's encouragement. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967)
(finding provision to be unconstitutional).
165 See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (using public functions test to find that
owner of company town could not deny constitutional rights of town's citizens).
166 See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (involving city maintenance of a park
donated by a private citizen for "whites only"). "[W]hen private individuals or groups
are endowed by the State with powers or functions governmental in nature, they become
agencies or instrumentalities of the State and subject to its constitutional limitations." Id.
at 299. Constitutional limitations cannot be escaped by delegating authority.
167 Id. at 299.
168 Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840 (1982) (citing Blum v. Yaretsky, 457
U.S. 991, 1101 (1982)); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974).
169 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 325.
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Congress allocates money for numerous causes, including the insuring and
purchasing of mortgages. 70 Congress apportions funds for the insurance of
mortgages to low income applicants, stepping in to pay when borrowers
default. Although controlling a bank is not an exclusive government
function, the allocation of government funds is the exclusive province of
Congress.' 7 ' Congress cannot violate due process in spending, 72 nor
can those entrusted by Congress to carry out the management of a bank
discriminate.
In levying taxes and providing for the expenditure of amounts collected
as such, the government acts as debt collector and loan officer. Rather than
creating and administering all social programs, the government creates
semi-private corporations to ensure the efficient functioning of essential
operations. The United States Post Office and Amtrak are examples of
such corporations. These entities, like banks, are merely means for
accomplishing government objectives. 173
2. Public Functions and State Banks
State banks may be held liable for equal protection violations under the
public functions doctrine only if the services provided are those generally
provided by the state government. The circulation of currency and the
control of fiscal policy are federal concerns, not state concerns. State
banks, although assisting in state fiscal policy, are less dependent upon the
state governments than upon the federal government.
Holding state banks liable for due process violations as actors of the
federal government is more feasible. Because state banks assist in the
distribution of capital created by the United States government, one link
is established. State banks further national fiscal policy by following
federally influenced interest rates and financing rates. Home finance rates
are highly influential in regulation of the economy.'74 As a leading
170 Through the Federal Housing Authority and Fannie Mae, whereby the government
backs the loans the Association purchases, federal funds are strongly tied to mortgage
activities. See generally Tony Munroe, Home-Loan Program for Poor Will Include D.C.,
WASH. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1993, at C1. Fannie Mae, in exchange for the government backed
loans, is required to focus on loans for affordable housing. In 1991, however, only 2.5%
of Fannie Mae loans were purchased in minority neighborhoods. Thomas, supra note 2,
at Al.
171 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
172 See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 480 (1980).
173 See generally McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 325 (stating that a bank is proper and suitable
instrument to assist operations of government).
174 See The MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour (PBS television broadcast, Apr. 28, 1992); Dori
Meinert, Common Cause Links Lawmakers Actions to Real Estate Donations, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB. Feb. 27, 1992, at A24 ("A healthy real estate industry is part and parcel
included in anything that is going to stimulate the economy .... ")
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indicator of economic growth, low mortgage rates translate into a growing
housing market, which increases job opportunities nationwide. 17 5 This
development would be impossible if state banks were isolated from the
influences of the federal government, because interest rates would vary
between states, causing some regions to grow, while others floundered
under the competition of the interest marketplace.
D. Arguments Against the State Actor Doctrine
It is impossible to predict which standard will be used by a court
examining the state actor doctrine. Arguments exist that the Supreme Court
has traveled away from and should continue to digress from this
requirement and instead should balance the interests of the parties. 176 It
does not appear, however, that the state actor doctrine will be replaced by
a balancing test.177 If the state actor component is retained as the
threshold analysis, no further constitutional analysis is warranted. Absent
a showing of direct government involvement, the failure of all state actor
tests precludes the use of constitutional analysis. If a bank is found to be
a state actor, the next question addressed is whether the banks actions
violate equal protection pursuant to the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution. 178
VII. THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF MINORITY RIGHTS
The United States Constitution states that no person shall be deprived
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. 179 The equal
175 Real estate is one of four groups, comprised of 57 indicators that are deemed
leading indicators. These indicators are used to predict anticipated economic change, in
that an increase in these areas generally signifies that the economy will grow. See Real
Estate Rebound Will Occur Late Next Year, 33 NAT'L REAL EST. INVESTOR 22 (1991).
176 Professor Chemerinsky theorized that if the balancing test were used, "courts in
each instance would determine whether the infringer's freedom adequately justified
permitting the alleged violation." Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 506.
Advocates of the balancing test insist that the impact of private actors is no less
harmful than the acts of government, and therefore, the state actor doctrine fails to
adequately protect the rights of individuals. See generally id. The expansion of
constitutional rights during the twentieth century was not accompanied by a corresponding
increase in common law protections. Id. at 517-19. Therefore, private discrimination may
have a greater impact on society than ever before.
77 See generally Sunstein, supra note 150 (discussing Sunstein's belief in a balancing
approach and concluding that the Court will not abandon the state actor requirement);
Snyder, supra note 150 (discussing purpose and need for retaining the state actor
doctrine).
178 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) gives individuals a cause of action for damages and
injunctive relief against those who violate the Fourteenth Amendment under color of state
law. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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protection doctrine means that similarly situated people must receive equal
treatment under the law."' ° When arbitrary and capricious decisions are
made that affect an individuals constitutional rights, the Equal Protection
Clause may be implicated. Victims of redlining, by virtue of the arbitrary
nature of the process, deserve redress under the Equal Protection Clause.
After finding that banks are state actors, further analysis is required to
determine if redlining is unconstitutional.
A. The Fifth Amendment and Equal Protection
The Constitution, designed to protect individual liberties from
government intrusion, extends to actions of both the federal and state
governments. The Fourteenth Amendment, however, reaches only the acts
of state governments or individuals acting under color of state
authority. 1 ' The policies of federally chartered banks are not to be
analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment. Due to the limited contact
between state governments and national banks, state actor analysis would
fail, and banks would be exempt from the constraints of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
In order to discuss the concept of equal protection when a federal actor
is implicated, it is first necessary to find equal protection guarantees
pertaining to the federal government. The Supreme Court, in Boiling v.
Sharpe,I"2 established that the Fifth Amendment, although without an
equal protection clause, forbids "discrimination ... so unjustifiable as to
be violative of due process." ' 3
In Boiling, the Supreme Court held that school segregation in the
District of Columbia violated the Due Process Clause. 8 4 Because the
"' U.S. CONST. amend. V, amend. XIV.
180 Dorsey v. Solomon, 435 F. Supp. 725, 734 (D.C. Md. 1977) (referring to Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)).
181 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
In First Nat'l Bank in St. Louis v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640 (1924), Justice Vandeventer
stated that the presence of a bank is "attributable to the national power, not to the state's
permission." Id. at 666 (Vandeventer, J., dissenting). Although national banks may be
governed by state law, the scope of state regulation is limited.
182 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
183 Id. at 499 (citations omitted).
184 Id. at 498-99. The holding in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
declaring separate but equal schools to be unconstitutional, was applied to schools in the
District of Columbia. Although the District of Columbia is not a state, the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment did not allow discrimination of this sort there. Bolling,
347 U.S. at 500.
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District of Columbia is under the jurisdiction of the United States
government, the Equal Protection Clause could not be relied upon.'85
Although the Court said that due process and equal protection ideas are not
always interchangeable, the terms are also not mutually exclusive.1
86
B. Equal Protection and Due Process Analysis
Discrimination in redlining violates the Due Process Clause. The
process of redlining is inherently suspect as overinclusive. Redlining, even
where some amount of caution in lending may be warranted, draws lines
excluding individuals and neighborhoods that are not high credit risks. In
order for plaintiffs in a due process/equal protection analysis to prevail,
however, they must show that they were the victims of intentionally
discriminatory treatment which infringed on or deprived them of a
fundamental right. 87 Defendant banks may counter by showing that there
is a compelling state interest in the action and that there are no less
restrictive means for fulfilling this state interest.
88
185 "[T]he District of Columbia is not a -State' within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment." District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 424 (1973). Congress serves
as the municipal legislator for the District and in exercise of such legislative power, is
subject to the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. See Boiling, 347 U.S. at 498.
186 Equal protection is a more expansive safeguard. Due process is included within this
notion, however. Bolling, 347 U.S. at 494.
187 A neutral law cannot be enforced only against particular groups and withstand
constitutional scrutiny. The unequal application of a law is a violation of the equal
protection rights of those persecuted or excluded under the law when race is the
determinative factor in enforcement. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 1.18 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886)
(holding that enforcement of fire code against Chinese laundries was unconstitutional due
to discriminatory administration by public officials).
Fundamental rights are those which are guaranteed by the Constitution, either explicitly
or implicitly. Price v. Cohen, 715 F.2d 87, 93 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1032
(1984) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 n.15 (1982)). The right to property is an
enumerated right under the United States Constitution, found in both the Fifth and the
Fourteenth Amendments. U.S. CONST. amend. V, amend. XIV, § 1. Included in the right
to property is the right to acquire and enjoy property. See Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366,
390-91 (1898) ("Property is more than the mere thing which a person owns. It is
elementary that it includes the right to acquire, use and dispose of it. The Constitution
protects these essential attributes of property."). The use of discriminatory factors in
granting mortgage loans denies access to property, denying the fundamental rights of
minority applicants. The Due Process Clause "adds nothing to the rights of one citizen
as against another. It simply furnishes an additional guaranty against any encroachment
by the States upon the fundamental rights which belong to every citizen as a member of
society." United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554 (1875).
188 See infra text accompanying notes 197-198.
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C. Intent
Proving discriminatory results is not difficult. Discriminatory intent,
however, is difficult to show absent proof of motive. When lines are drawn
on the basis of race, as with redlining, the action of the government is
analyzed under strict scrutiny review. 189 Lending rates and disparity
statistics are available to the public for all banks and all branches under
the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act.1 9° Reported to the Federal Reserve
annually, these statistics provide each banks lending ratio information.
Using this information, plaintiffs may prove that a particular bank has a
disparate lending ratio.' 9'
This disparate ratio, however, is not enough. The information provided
through the HMDA is generated without removal of non-racial factors.
Only under specialized studies, like that of the Boston Federal
Reserve, 192 can the figures point to disparities that must be the result of
racial discrimination. It is possible, however, that if these factors are
removed, and these results point to discrimination, intent may be inferred.
The Supreme Court has stated that "an invidious discriminatory purpose
may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the
fact, if it is true, that the law bears more heavily on one race than
another."' 93
This ties directly into the next requirement. There is no indication that
bank loan procedures were devised with a discriminatory intent. The
showing is rather that lending policies are not adhered to in a uniform way
and are applied in a discriminatory fashion against minorities. This
subconscious intent to discriminate is determinable by the disparate lending
rates to whites and African Americans, who, other than race, are similarly
situated.
189 City of Richmond v. Croson, 448 U.S. 469, 493-97 (1989).
190 12 U.S.C. § 2803 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Information provided pursuant to the
HMDA is utilized by both community groups and the government, including the Federal
Reserve, to effectuate anti-discrimination legislation.
191 O'Hara, supra note 33, § 1, at 3 (discussing how Anne Shlay used figures provided
by HMDA to challenge bank mergers under Community Reinvestment Act).
192 The Boston Federal Reserve study removed factors to determine whether credit
applicants were truly similarly situated. Absent such specialized data, however, banks
would be able to hide behind theories that minorities were less creditworthy.
'9' Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (finding that such statistical proof
can raise an inference of discrimination). The use of statistical disparity resulting from a
neutral law in which no subjective criteria are utilized, however, will usually be
inadequate to support a claim that equal protection rights were violated. Id. Lending
discrimination is based largely on subjective factors utilized by lending officers in making
their decisions.
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D. Similarly Situated Treated Differently
Minority plaintiffs must also prove that similarly situated whites were
granted loans or granted loans under more favorable terms. Any individual
denied, under authority of the State, a facility or convenience that is
furnished to another under substantially the same circumstances, may
properly complain that his constitutional rights have been violated. 94
Failure to prove this element or the existence of overt policies of racial
discrimination would allow banks to claim that, although there is a
disparity in lending rates, this disparity results from more minority
applicants who are less qualified.
Pursuant to the HMDA, information regarding all loans and
applications must be available to customers.'95 Using this information,
minorities injured by the discriminatory policies of banks may find support
for their assertions of discriminatory lending practices.'96
E. Compelling State Interest
Defendant banks may assert that the state actors-banks-have a
legitimate compelling interest in setting mortgage lending standards.
97
This argument becomes clouded when the alleged compelling state interest
is defined. A compelling state interest is one in which the state actor has
a legitimate concern of significance to the entity. It may be said that banks
have a special interest in ensuring that borrowers are in a financial position
to repay the loan. Banks do not operated to serve as charitable
organizations, but rather they operate for the profit of shareholders. This
profit motive is no reason to deny loans solely on the basis of race,
however.
On the other side, there is an argument that no compelling state interest
can be found for denying loans to minorities. This is a correct assertion as
well. The denial of loans to minorities is tied to no interest of the
government, and there is no legitimate reason why financially qualified
African Americans should not receive mortgage loans. This argument,
however, should not be necessary, because lines drawn on the basis of race
are inherently suspect,'98 and therefore, banks would be required to show
194 McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 235 U.S. 151, 161-62 (1914).
'95 12 U.S.C. § 2803(a)(1) (1988).
196 See Thomas, supra note 2 (discussing evidence of discrimination from compiled
data).
'9' See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (establishing that when a racially-based
classification violates equal protection and due process rights, government must prove that
it has a compelling interest in the classification and that the classification is necessary to
accomplish the interest).
' Id. at 11; McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964). "I cannot conceive
of a valid legislative purpose ... for a... law which makes the color of a person's skin
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this interest exists. Furthermore, any concerns may be alleviated by
examining the least restrictive means portion of equal protection analysis.
F. Least Restrictive Means
The least restrictive means test is utilized once a compelling state
interest has been shown. The least restrictive means test requires that the
method of racial classification be as narrowly tailored as possible in order
to accomplish the goal.'99 Adhering to the test requires that the focus of
the government action not be overly broad. In order for banks to meet the
least restrictive means test, the standard for determining when a person
will be granted a mortgage must be narrowly tailored to reliably determine
the true risk associated with lending to a particular person. The location of
property within an area generally occupied by minorities is not a factor
indicative of high risk but rather indicates the banking industrqs
willingness to perpetuate the myths of the past and engage in
discriminatory behavior.
The process of redlining targets entire neighborhoods deemed high risk,
regardless of the creditworthiness of individuals applying for loans.
Because these neighborhoods are almost always comprised of racial
minorities, African Americans, Latinos, and other minorities who have a
good credit rating will be left without access to the housing market. The
overinclusiveness of this type of policy fails to adequately satisfy the least
restrictive means test.2°
°
By holding banks to a constitutional standard of equal protection, the
process of mortgage lending will change. The current banking regulatory
structure allows lending decisions to be made on the basis of both
objective and subjective criteria. The policy of relying on nonpredictive
factors in the allocation of loans cannot persist. By implementing
constitutional standards, the procedures for determining loan eligibility
would receive greater governmental scrutiny. Careful examination of the
current decision making process of banks reveals a reliance on factors
unpredictive of risk. Governmental interference and the use of standardized
the test of whether his conduct is criminal offense." Id. at 198 (Stewart, J., joined by
Douglas. J., concurring).
19 The classification or treatment must be necessary for achievement of the legitimate
government goal. The unequal treatment of minorities is unnecessary for achieving healthy
lending policies. The principals of lending must be applied neutrally in terms of
creditworthiness, and the factors used to determine creditworthiness must be drawn from
nondiscriminatory factors that take into account past credit prejudices.
200 See McLaughlin, 379 U.S at 191-93. See generally DENNIS & POTTINGER, supra
note 8, 1.01-.04 (discussing different concepts of redlining and different theories of the
effects on minorities).
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objective criteria are essential to ensure that minorities are not denied
access to loans.
G. The Right to Be Free From Discrimination
Redlining denies minorities the opportunity to own homes and denies
them the chance for the personal development associated with home
ownership. In a speech before being elected, President Lincoln spoke of
the intent of the signers of the Declaration of Independence:
They did not mean to say all were equal in color, size,
intellect, moral development, or social capacity. They
defined with tolerable distinctness in what respect they did
consider all men created equal-equal with "certain
unalienable rights, among which are life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness. 2 0'
Lincoln intended that there was a need for equal treatment under the laws
through equality of opportunity.0 2
The denial of mortgages is the type of denial of opportunity that
President Lincoln intended to eradicate. Minorities have the right to be free
from racial discrimination. No individual should be denied the opportunity
to become a homeowner on the basis of race. Equality of opportunity
means the right to be free from arbitrary external constraints.2 3 The
government is not obliged to give people the financial resources necessary
to secure homes, but it must ensure that there are no obstacles of
discrimination standing in their path.20" Professor Tribe states that "in the
contemporary view, the function of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
specifically the equal protection clause, was to guarantee racially equal
access to these rights. 20 5
201 Abraham Lincoln, An Address Delivered at Springfield (June 26, 1857), in THE
IDEA OF EQUALITY: AN ANTHOLOGY 185 (George L. Abemethy ed., 1959).
202 Kingsley R. Browne, Liberty v. Equality: Congressional Enforcement Power Under
the Fourteenth Amendment, 59 DENV. L.J. 417, 439.
203 See generally id. at 439-40 (stating that equality of opportunity is philosophically
compatible with the negative form of freedom).
204 Equal protection guarantees under the Fifth Amendment are not substantive, but
rather are the right to be free from invidious discrimination in statutory classifications.
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322 (1980).
205 LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1152 n.14 (1978).
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Deprivation of the equal protection rights of minorities by denying
access to loans essentially eliminates the potential for minority home
ownership. This denial of a fundamental right by virtue of banls
discriminatory lending policies cannot be allowed to continue. Banks must
be held to a constitutional standard of equal protection in an effort to
prevent the continuation of racial discrimination. The current regulatory
structure fails to compel bank compliance with federal guidelines for
nondiscriminatory loan disbursement. In an effort to completely eradicate
the discrimination of the past, a new constitutional test of loan procedures
must be developed and utilized.
A constitutional standard is possible because national banks are
instrumentalities of the federal government. As such, national banks cannot
be allowed to assert their quasi-public status in order to avoid taxation,
while failing to fulfill the obligations associated with the status of being
a state actor. The promulgation of further non-constitutional regulations
will merely add to the confused package of statutes currently failing to
regulate lending practices adequately. Because the rights of equal
protection and property are essential to individual liberty, a new standard,
a strict scrutiny standard, is needed to judge the procedures of banks for
processing mortgage applications.
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